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This Brief is filed by the appellant Bodell Construction 
Company. Bodell seeks i) the reversal of the trial court's 
Summary Judgment in favor of Snelson and McOmber, ii) the entry 
of Judgment in favor of Bodell, and iii) the remand of the case 
for the purpose of establishing the amount of deficiency due 
Bodell. In the alternative, Bodell seeks a determination that 
summary judgment in favor of Snelson and McOmber was 
inappropriate because material issues of fact existed. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Utah constitution and U. C. A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Was the trustee' s sale conducted in August, 1984 
void for want of a buyer and an authorized bid? 
2. Did the trustee have authority to bid on behalf of 
the beneficiary (Bodell) at the August 19, 1985 trustee's sale? 
3. Did the District Court err in ruling as a matter 
of law and by summary judgment that the trustee (Associated 
Title) was authorized to bid for Bodell, or that Bodell ratified 
the bid? 
4. Did the Court error in not granting plaintiff s 
motion for summary judgment? 
Standard for Review: 
The issues were each decided by summary judgment. The 
standard of review on this appeal is for this court to review 
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the trial court' s conclusions of law for correctness. Gillman v. 
Dept. of Financial Instit. . 782 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1989). Because 
the trial court granted summary judgment against Bodell, this 
court should construe the facts presented in the summary 
judgment proceedings in the light most favorable to Bodell. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Bodell does not assert that the interpretation of any 
statute or rule of procedure is determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is one to determine the invalidity of a 
trustee' s sale. Competing motions for summary judgment were 
filed in the district court. (R. 190, 221. ) Summary judgment 
was first entered in favor of the defendants by the Fourth 
District Court in May, 1987. (R. 268. ) That decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court by Bodell. The appeal was 
dismissed because of the lack of a Rule 54(b) order. (R. 462.) 
The trial court allowed the parties to augment the record and 
affirmed its prior ruling granting summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants. (R. 568. ) The trial court included in its Order 
a Rule 54(b) determination of finality. This case was 
transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on 
June 25, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for 
review: 
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1. The loan which is the subject of this action was 
brokered by Roger Terry of Landmark Mortgage. Terry, a 
representative of Landmark, was originally contacted by 
representatives of Snelson and McOmber to see if he could arrange 
the loan. (Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 14) Terry was paid a 
fee by Snelson and McOmber to secure the loan. (Exhibit 6 to the 
McOmber deposition, R. 287. ) Terry contacted Bodell to see if 
Bodell was interested in providing funds for the loan. (Bodell7 s 
first deposition, 11/25/86, R. 288, p. 16. ) Bodell had made some 
(five or ten) prior mortgage loans, only one of which had gone 
bad and which was cured after the foreclosure process began but 
before sale. Bodell is a construction company and was not in 
the business of making mortgage loans. (Bodell' s deposition, R. 
288, p. 13 and 14. ) 
2. In November, 1983, Bodell loaned Snelson and McOmbers 
$200, 000. 00 pursuant to a note secured by a trust deed on 
McOmbers' residence. (McOmber Answer, para. 3, R. 11. ) 
3. The purpose of the loan was, in part, for Snelsons and 
McOmbers to raise venture capital for a joint enterprise. 
(McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 22. ) 
4. No payments were ever made on the note. (McOmber 
deposition, R. 287, p. 22. ) 
5. On January 9, 1984, when Bodell asked Roger Terry of 
Landmark Mortgage to have someone begin foreclosure, Terry asked 
for and was given by Bodell the following letter to "get the ball 
rolling: " 
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Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as 
authorization to immediately begin 
foreclosure against the property associated 
with this loan. 
We grant you and the title company of 
your choice full and complete authority 
regarding this foreclosure action. 
Please inform me if you require further 
information. 
Very truly yours, 
s/Michael J. Bodell 
(Bodell's deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 26; Letter is Exhibit 6 to 
Terry deposition. ) 
(At the time of the February 23, 1990 hearing, there was 
before the trial court by oral stipulation three depositions 
which were not yet included in the record on appeal at the time 
appellant prepared its opening brief. Appellant is working to 
have these items included by the clerk. Those depositions were 
as follows: Deposition of Michael Bodell dated 2/8/89; 
Deposition of Roger Terry dated 12/22/88; and Deposition of Blake 
Heiner, dated 2/8/89. In addition, a transcript of the summary 
judgment hearing has been requested but is not completed. ) 
6. Terry told Bodell that he needed the January 9 letter 
for "authorization to deliver papers to a trustee to start the 
foreclosure." Terry ultimately asked Associated Title to act as 
the trustee and start the foreclosure. (Terry deposition dated 
12/22/88, p. 34-39. ) 
7. There is no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber 
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ever saw Bodell' s letter of January 9, J.^64. McOmber never spoke 
to Associated Title before the sale, (McOmber deposition, R. 
287, p. 23. ) 
8. Snelson never had any contact with Bodell at any time. 
(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. ) 
9. Both Roger Terry (Landmark) and Blake Heiner 
(Associated) stated that they never understood that the January 9 
letter gave them authority to determine the bid for Bode 1.1 at the 
trustee' s sale. (Affidavits of Blake Heiner and Roger Terry, R. 
214, 211, copies attached as Exhibits 1 and 2. ) 
10. Blake Heiner testified wi t:h i:ega rd 1:c the J anuary 9, 
1984 letter that: 
a. he never discussed it with Bodell or Terry 
(Heiner deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 21); and, 
b. that Associated Title would not have relied on the 
letter as giving it authority to determine the bid at 
the sale and that they did not do so in this case. 
(Heiner deposition, 2/8/89, p. 22, 1. 1-4, 6-9. ) 
11. Roger Terry testified that he would be very surprised 
if Bodell took the position that Terry was handling the 
foreclosure sale for him. "I wasn't handling anything for him. 
The only thing that I did for him was to start the foreclosure. " 
(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 126. ) 
12. Prior to the August sale of the property, Bodell had 
come that .• - • ^  property was far 
less than the unpaid loan balance. Bodell had told Roger Terry 
at Landmark prior to the first sale that Bodell wanted to obtain 
a deficiency from the sale. (Bodell s • :3 eposi tion, 2/8/89, p. 39, 
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40, 41; Bodell affidavit, paragraph 2, R. 500; Roger Terry 
deposition, Exhibit 5A - entry at 8/23/84 at page 2 of Exhibit 
5A. ) 
13. Roger Terry of Landmark testified that his wife was 
contacted by Associated Title (the trustee) shortly before the 
sale and asked to give a payoff amount. Mr. Terry testified that 
he called Associated back with the loan payoff amount as 
requested. Terry understood that this amount was needed in case 
Snelson or McOmber wanted to pay the loan off prior to the sale. 
Terry never understood that he was being requested to give a bid 
amount for the sale. Terry knew at the time he called Associated 
and left a message giving the payoff amount that Bodell wanted to 
obtain a deficiency. (Terry deposition, p. 56, 57, 66, and 
Exhibit 5A. ) 
14. Blake Heiner (of Associated Title, the trustee) 
testified that he could not recall discussing with Terry any 
request for a bid amount in connection with this sale. Heiner 
agreed in his deposition that any conversation likely could have 
been in the form of a message left with Terry' s wife. When Mr. 
Heiner went to the sale, the only information that he had from 
Mr. Terry was in the form of a telephone message which stated, in 
full, that the "payoff on sale tomorrow ($243, 127. 15) plus 
foreclosure costs." (The telephone message is attached as 
Exhibit 3 and is at R. 205. ) (Heiner deposition, pp. 11, 12, 44, 
45. ) 
15. The "payoff" amount which Terry gave Heiner included 
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not only the amount due under the trust deed, but Terry' s loan 
fees owed him by McOmber and Snelson. (Bodell deposition, 
2/8/89, ^ 79; Terry deposition, p. 71, 72. ) 
16. Neither Landmark nor Associated ever discussed bidding 
with Bodell before the first sale. 1 n tact, Associated never 
spoke with Bodell at all before the first sale. Bodell did not 
understand that he had a right to bid at the sale. Bodell did 
not know and was never told that anj amount would be b:i ci at the 
sale on his behalf and assumed that if no one bid, he would own 
the property. Bodell did not know that Associated needed bidding 
instructions. (Bodell affidavit, paragraphs 2-6, 8, R. 500-503; 
Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36, 38, 64-69, 72, 114. ). 
17. Ho one other than Blake Heiner of Associated Title 
attended the August 31, 1984 !:: zi us tee ' s sal e (Heiner affidavit, 
para. 5, R. 211. ) 
18. The "Bid" referred to in the trustee's deed, dated 
September 11, 1984 was made by Blake Heiner at the sale on August 
31, 1984 and was based upon the telephone message he received 
from Terry which gave the "payoff" amount. (Heiner affidavit, 
para. 6, R. 211, 212. ) 
19. There is no evidence that Snelson or McOmber ever 
discussed with Bodell, Associated or Terry at any time the amount 
bid or to be bid at the sale. There is no evidence that Snelson 
or McOmber were ever aware of what amount was to be bid or was in 
fact bid at sale. Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the first 
sale. McOmber continued to reside in the home even after the 
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first sale. (McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 22, 23; Heiner 
depo. , p. 19; Bodell depo. , p. 91. ) 
20. The trust deed given to Bodell by McOmber authorized 
Bodell, upon any default by McOmber, to collect rents upon 
default. (A copy of the trust deed is at R. 202, para. 10 and 
11. ) After the date of the August (first) trustees sale, Bodell 
signed an agreement listing the property for sale. The listing 
contained an exception for the benefit of McOmber. Bodell also 
accepted one rent check from occupants of a basement apartment in 
the amount of $200. 00. (Listing is Exhibit 18 to Terry 
deposition; Bodell affidavit, para. 7, R. 501, 502. ) 
21. As soon as Bodell became aware of the dollar amount of 
the bid made by Associated at the August sale, Bodell objected. 
(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 80. ) 
22. On or about October 3, 1984, and within a few days of 
when it received the trustee' s deed, Bodell sought legal advice 
about how it could collect the balance due on its note. Prior to 
Bodell's October 3, 1984 meeting with Richard Rappaport, neither 
Associated nor Landmark had explained to Bodell the role the 
amount bid at sale played in obtaining a deficiency. At Bodell' s 
meeting with Rappaport, Bodell learned for the first time that 
Associated' s unauthorized bid could affect Bodell' s right to 
obtain a deficiency. (Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 113, 114, 
84, 82; Bodell affidavit, para. 6, 8, 9, R. 501-503. ) 
23. After Bodell was advised by Rappaport of the role that 
the amount bid played in obtaining a deficiency, Bodell contacted 
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McOmber and Associated Title and advised them that the bid had 
not been authorized Bodell terminated his listing and McOmber 
entered into a new listing agreement with the real estate agent, 
Cal Monson, effective October 4, 1984 and continued to reside in 
the home and attempt to s ell the home uiit: i J after the s econd 
sale. The listing agreement signed by McOmber states in part 
that 
"I [McOmber] hereby warrant the information herein to 
be correct and that I have marketable title or an 
otherwise established right to sell, lease or exchange 
said property, except as stated. •' 
(Listing Agreement, R. 206. ) (Bodell affidavit, R. 501, 502; 
Bodell deposition, p. 93, 8 6, 81. ) Associated Title accepted and 
recorder quit clai in deed back f re ~ -c- • ch stated i n p art 
that "this deed is given to reconvey a trusteed deed which was 
recorded September 11, 1984 which was erroneously given to Bodell 
Construction Company. " Associated recorded this deed, published 
a new notice of sale, and reconducted the sale on the 19th day of 
November, 1984. (R. 202, 207. ) 
24. The property was resold on Nc member 19, 1984. At this 
sale, a bid of $170,000.00 was made at the direction of Bodell. 
(R. 240). 
SillMMAk'iii' Dl ARGUMENT 
The pivotal issue on appeal is whether there was an 
authorized bid at the August, 1984 (first) trustee7 s sale. If no 
authorized bid was made, there was no buyer and no sale. Bodell 
contends that the trustee (Associated) had no authority, actual 
or apparent, to purchase the property on Bodell' s behalf at the 
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August sale and that no sale occurred, Bodell did not ratify the 
first sale. Bodell never had knowledge of material facts or the 
requisite intent sufficient to sustain, on summary judgment, 
ratification. 
In the alternative, the record with regard to the authority 
of the trustee to bid at the August, 1984 sale and ratification 
was such that summary judgment against Bodell was not 
appropriate and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE AUGUST 31, 1984 (FIRST) TRUSTEE'S SALE 
WAS VOID FOR WANT OF AN AUTHORIZED BUYER. 
The August 31, 1984 trustee's sale (the first sale) could 
have been valid only if the trustee, Associated Title, had 
authority to bid and purchase on behalf of Bodell Construction at 
that sale. Without authority, there was no buyer and no sale. 
The trial courts judgment, (R. 573, 574) concludes that 
"...Associated Title had actual and apparent authority to conduct 
the Trustee' s sale and enter a bid . . . *' This conclusion of law 
is subject to review in this court for correctness. Gillman v. 
Dept. of Financial Instit. , 782 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1989). 
It is hornbook law that an agent's authority is "composed of 
his [1] actual authority, express or implied, together with the 
The Judgment (R. 572) was mailed to the trial court on 
April 19 (a Thursday) and signed on April 24 (a Tuesday), without 
any opportunity for the plaintiff to object to any of the 
statements included by Snelson, all contrary to Rule 4-504(2) 
C. J. A. 
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[2] apparent or ostensible authority which the principal by his 
conduct precludes h i mself from denying. 2,A C. J. S. Agency* §146. 
A Associated Title had no actual authority to bid at the 
August 31, 1984 sale. This matter was decided by summary 
j udgment. Becaus e summary j udgment dep:i ::l ves a pa i : t:;y (here 
Bodell) of its opportunity to present its case on the merits, 
appellate courts review the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was 
granted. Seftel v. Capital gitY PfrflX/ 767 P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 
1989). 2 
Neither the letter ::> f J a n u a r y 9, 19 8 4 i I o i: a i y o t her 
communication from Bodell authorized either Terry or Associated 
Title to do anything other than to "begin foreclosure" under the 
trust deed. (Exhibit 6 to Terry deposition. ) Neither the letter 
nor any conversation expressly authorized Associated Title to 
either determine a bid or purchase the property for Bodell. 
Snelson' s argument before the trial court that Associated 
Title had actual authority to purchase and enter a bid is really 
an argument that the authority of Associated Title was implied. 
The implied authority, as presented by Snelson, relies upon two 
factors: 
(a) The January 9, 1984 letter which states in full 
that: 
2 
Because the case was decided on summary judgment, the 
only facts to be marshalled in support of the judgment (if indeed 
there is an obligation to marshall facts) are found in 
defendants' statement of facts in its Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion. (R. 485-490. ) 
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Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as 
authorization to immediately begin 
foreclosure against the property 
associated with this loan. 
We hereby grant you and the 
title company of your choice full 
and complete authority regarding 
this foreclosure action. 
Pl^frge inform me 
if you require further information. 
Very truly yours, 
S/Michael J. Bodell 
(Emphasis added, ) 
(Letter is Exhibit 6 to Terry deposition dated 
12/22/88.) 
(b) Secondly, Snelson relies upon the event of the 
trustee' s sale itself as creating implied authority in the title 
company to bid. 
1. The January 9 letter did not create authority. 
The undisputed evidence was that the letter was not relied 
on by those involved in the sale as granting authority to either 
Associated or Landmark to bid on or purchase the property at the 
sale. (Heiner deposition, p. 22; Terry deposition, p. 61; Bodell 
deposition 2/8/89, p. 26, 32. ) While the trial court did not 
state the basis for its conclusion that Associated had authority 
to purchase the property for Bodell at the trustee' s sale, in the 
summary judgment proceedings the trial court apparently chose to 
ignore this undisputed evidence. Snelson' s argument that the 
January 9 letter created authority is a lawyer' s argument 
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created after the fact for a party that never saw or was aware of 
the letter until after this action was commenced. Where there 
was no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber ever saw or relied 
on the January 9 letter, the interpretation of the letter by the 
parties to it (Bodell, Landmark and Associated) should be, not 
only persuasive, but determinative of the fact that it granted no 
authority to Associated to bid or purchase for Bodell. Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d 266 (Utah 1972). 
The facts and circumstances around the letter construed in 
the light most favorable to Bodell create, at a minimum, a 
genuine issue of material fact about the extent of authority the 
letter granted: 
(i) Heiner himself testified that he would not 
have treated the January 9 letter as authority to bid 
(Heiner deposition, p. 22); 
(ii) Terry informed Bodell that the 
letter was required to start the foreclosure 
process (Terry deposition, p. 35); 
(iii) Neither Terry nor Heiner 
considered the letter as a grant of authority 
to determine the amount to be bid at the 
sale. (Affidavits of Blake Heiner and Roger 
Terry, R. 211, 214. ) 
(iv) The letter itself does not state 
that Terry or any title company had authority 
to purchase the property on behalf of Bodell. 
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The Restatement of Agency 2d, §34, states in part that: 
An authorization is interpreted 
in light of all accompanying 
circumstances, including among 
other matters, (a) the situation of 
the parties, their relations to one 
another, and the business in which 
they are engaged: . . . (d) the 
nature of the subject matter, the 
circumstances under which the act 
is to be performed and the legality 
or illegality of the act; and (e) 
the formality or informality, and 
the care, or lack of it, with which 
an instrument evidencing the 
authority is drawn. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Snelson obviously relies upon the second paragraph in the 
January 9 letter which refers to the "full and complete 
authority" regarding the foreclosure action and takes the 
position that the full authority granted included the right to 
determine and make a bid at the sale and purchase the property. 
This argument ignores the fact that no one involved at the time 
gave the language such a broad interpretation. This argument 
also ignores the fact that the second paragraph merely modifies 
the first, it simply makes clear the authority with respect to 
beginning the sale. If full authority on all matters was being 
given, there would be no purpose in including the last paragraph 
inviting questions. Even if the second paragraph were not a 
modifying paragraph, the term "full authority" is not the 
equivalent of absolute or unlimited discretion. Thomas v. 
Kennedy. 130 A. 2d 97 (Pa. 1957). 
As discussed in §34 of the Restatement, Snelson' s argument 
must be considered in light of the situation of both Bodell and 
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Associated. Bodell was not experienced in foreclosures. He 
never understood this simple letter to grant anyone decision 
making authority, but understood it simply as a request to get 
the "ball rolling." (Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26, 30, 31.) 
The letter, when considered in light of Associated' s position as 
trustee, was not in fact acted upon by Associated as creating the 
authority to bid and purchase the property for Bodell. (Heiner 
deposition, p. 22. ) As set forth in the Affidavit of Alfred 
Newman, no title officer would reasonably infer such broad 
authority from such a general letter of instructions. (R. 505, 
para. 5) The only evidence before the trial court on the scope 
of authority to be drawn from the letter was i) that no authority 
was considered by Associated to have been given by the letter to 
determine and make the bid without further instruction, and ii) 
that no trustee in Utah would have acted upon the January 9 
letter as giving it authority to bid at the sale or purchase the 
property without further instructions. 
Such a broad interpretation of authority as sought by 
Snelson is not favored by courts in determining the scope of 
authority. For example, in Mercantile Trust Co. . N. A. v. Harper, 
622 S. W. 2d 345 (Mo. App. 1981) the contention was that a power of 
attorney given to "transact all matters of business" allowed a 
stock broker to rely upon the power of attorney to deposit the 
client' s funds in any manner he chose. As a result of the way 
the funds were deposited by the broker (into a joint account), 
the funds were lost. In discussing the scope of authority 
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granted, the Court observed as follows: 
Well established rules of interpretation of 
powers of attorney dictate that broad, all-
encompassing grants of power to the agent 
must be discounted. Restatement (2d) of 
Agency, §34, comment h (1958). Potentially 
hazardous powers, such as the power to 
borrow money on behalf of the principal, 
cannot be inferred from the power of 
attorney; it must be reasonably clear that 
the principal intended to grant such power. 
Id. Language in a power of attorney that 
apparently grants broad power to convey the 
principal's property, such as the power to 
convey "as sufficiently as [the principal] 
could do personally, " is deemed to be mere 
"window dressing" and must be disregarded. 
. . (622 S. W. 2d at 349. ) 
Section 37 of the Restatement of Agency 2d, states in part 
as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, general 
expressions used in authorizing an agent are 
limited in application to acts done in 
connection with the act or business to which 
the authority primarily relates. 
(2) A specific authorization of particular 
acts tends to show that the more general 
authority is not intended. (emphasis added.) 
In the January 9 letter, the specific authority in the first 
paragraph was "to immediately begin foreclosure." Terry told 
Bodell the letter was needed to begin the foreclosure. (Bodell 
deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26.) As a matter of law, the more general 
authority of the second paragraph can not be interpreted as a 
carte blanche, but merely as descriptive of the authority to 
begin foreclosure. In Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A. 2d 240 (Md. 
1966), a partnership existed for the purposes of "ownership and 
promotion for development of a tract of land. " In considering 
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the meaning of the authority to promote, the Court considered 
parole evidence, and determined that the authority to promote did 
not include the authority to construct improvements on the 
property and give mortgages to pay for those improvements. 
"It is also generally held that power and 
authority not specifically delegated in a pa-
rtnership agreement is presumed to be 
withheld." (p. 245.) . . . It is difficult 
to stretch an authorization to promote for 
the development of land and in the process to 
execute conveyances into an authorization for 
the managing partners to mortgage land 
without the partnership receiving the 
proceeds of the mortgage or into an 
authorization for the managing partners to 
make unsecured loans for themselves, 
Restatement (Second), Agency §37, 
particularly without advising the limited 
partners of their intent to do so. " (at 246) 
Applied to this case, the authority given by Bodell was to 
start the foreclosure process. That authorization cannot be 
stretched into the right to determine and enter a bid. 
2. The sale alQnQ does not create express or implied 
authority in Associated. 
Snelson argued (R. 493) that Associated's authority to bid 
at the sale was incident to Bodell7 s request that Associated 
conduct the foreclosure. The suggestion that trustees, who are 
obligated to conduct trustee' s sales, have plenary authority to 
bid and purchase property at those sales for either beneficiaries 
or trustors is an unsettling prospect. Snelson gave the trial 
court absolutely no evidence in support of the position that a 
request to a trustee in Utah to conduct a foreclosure sale 
carries with it the right to bid on or purchase the property 
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without further instruction. Snelson simply asked the trial 
court to assume that a beneficiary' s request to a trustee to sell 
carries with it the authority for the trustee to bid and purchase 
at the sale on behalf of the beneficiary. 
Section 35 of the Restatement of Agency 2d states in part 
that 
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to 
conduct a transaction includes authority to 
do acts which are incidental to it, usually 
accompany it or are reasonably necessary to 
accomplish it. " 
In considering whether or not the authority to sell at a 
trustee's sale carries with the authority to purchase the 
property for the beneficiary, this Court should consider the 
testimony of Blake Heiner (Associated) where he stated that he 
would not have determined the bid without further authority. 
(Heiner deposition, p. 22. ) Implied authority must also be 
considered in light of the Affidavit of Alfred J. Newmam, (R. 
505, para. 5) wherein Newman stated that authority to determine a 
bid does not flow from the mere request to conduct a foreclosure. 
Indeed, Mr. Newman states that industry practices are such that 
trustees in Utah either obtain written bidding instructions or at 
a minimum, advise the beneficiary to seek legal counsel with 
respect to the consequences of its bid. Newman' s affidavit, 
which was not disputed, is the only evidence of industry 
practices, and makes it clear that there is no industry standard 
in Utah that a trustee has authority to bid or purchase for a 
beneficiary, unless he has express instructions to do so. 
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Industry practices may be considered by this Court in 
determining the scope of authority incident to the sale. In 
Ebasco Services. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. . 402 
F. Supp. 421, subsequent decision at 460 F. Supp. 163 (E. D. Pa. 
1975), the supplier of turbines to a general contractor on a 
"turn key" power plant project contended that the utility's 
employment of the general contractor to do all of the things 
necessary to create a turn key project included the right to bind 
the utility (the principal) with respect to warranties on 
equipment delivered. The agreement between the utility and the 
contractor stated that "Ebasco shall in all cases use its best 
efforts to obtain for PP&L warranties against defects and design, 
workmanship and materials, the most favorable possible guarantees 
of performance, . . . (447)." The Court recognized that, while 
in general, the question of the scope of authority created by a 
written instrument is for the Court, that in deciding the issue, 
that industry standards and expectations were material issues 
necessary to its decision. The Court stated: 
While we cannot foresee the precise nature of 
proof on this issue, it would seem that the 
fact finder could consider in addition to the 
facts concerning the relation between Ebasco 
and PP&L, the practice in the construction 
industry relating to authority given to turn 
key c o n t r a c t o r s with respect to 
specifications, change orders and general 
contractual terms and conditions. The 
evidence might elucidate the question of 
whether turn key contractors have plenary 
power to give up beneficial contractual 
provisions without consideration. (449-450.) 
In this case, the only evidence on industry standards is the 
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Newman affidavit (R. 505) which supports the conclusion that 
trustees in Utah are not viewed as having plenary power to bid 
for or purchase the property for the beneficiary at a trustee' s 
sale in the absence of additional express authority. The trial 
court' s conclusion of implied authority ignores this contrary and 
undisputed testimony. 
In considering whether the right to bid is "incident" to the 
request to sell, this Court should consider that it does not 
follow that merely because a sale is set that it will 
necessarily be concluded. In the context of this sale, when 
Blake Heiner got to the sale and observed that no one was present 
on behalf of Bodell to bid (and in fact no one was present to 
bid) he could have and should have continued the sale. (U. C. A. 
§57-1-27(2). ) There is also a considerable difference between 
conducting a sale of property and buying property. 
Limitations on incidental authority are also reflected in 
the case of Cruikshank v. Horn. 386 N. W. 2d 134 (Iowa A. 1986). 
Horn was an auctioneer who conducted a farm sale for Cruikshank. 
After the sale, Horn deposited the sale proceeds in a bank 
account entitled "Hazel Cruikshank Sale - Don Horn - Clerk" in a 
bank which failed the next day and the funds were lost. The 
issue was whether or not the auctioneer had authority incident 
to the sale to deposit the checks and other proceeds from the 
sale to allow all of the funds to be collected before paying them 
to the owner of the property. Horn attempted to establish that 
his actions were consistent with the practice and custom of the 
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community. The custom and practice, however, was highly 
disputed. The Court observed that even if Horn assumed 
Cruikshank knew the proceeds would be deposited in a bank 
account, such an assumption was not warranted. Cruikshank 
admitted that no specific instructions had been given as to how 
the funds were to be handled. 
"Had Cruikshank simply been informed of and 
consented to the manner in which Horn handled 
the proceeds, the result may well have been 
different. Because Horn breached his 
fiduciary duty to disclose all relevant 
information, i.e. how the proceeds would be 
handled, and did not obtain Cruikshank' s 
consent to depositing them in a bank, Horn 
acted outside the scope of his authority." 
Applied to the facts of this case, had Associated Title simply 
informed Bodell of the bidding process and its need to obtain 
bidding instructions, the result would certainly have been 
different. 
There are many cases in which it was contended that an owner 
of property, by employing a real estate agent to sell real 
property for a certain price, necessarily cloaked the agent with 
authority to enter into the agreement to sell on behalf of the 
principal. It has been uniformly held that such an agreement 
does not give a seller' s agent authority to sell, even though the 
sale is the contemplated event, but merely authorizes the agent 
to deliver a buyer. ESPV v. Eels. 207 N. E. 2d 918 (Mass. 1965); 
Kellv v. Lonameyer, 435 S. W. 2d 818 (Tenn. 1967); Roskwitalski v. 
Reiss, 402 A. 2d 1061, affd. in relevant part and reversed in 
part, 487 A. 2d 864 (Pa. 1979). The authority sought by Snelson 
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in this case is even more tenuous. In this case, Associated was 
asked to sell. Instead they bought. Applying the rule of the 
foregoing cases, the request to a trustee to foreclose does not 
carry with it the right to determine the bid and buy at the sale 
on behalf of the beneficiary. Ellsworth v. Harmon, 101 111. 274 
(1881). 
The subject of the implied authority of a trustee under a 
trust deed to bid at a sale is rejected in Corpus Juris Secundum 
as follows: 
It is permissible for the trustee or 
auctioneer, acting in good faith, to make a 
bid at the request of a prospective purchaser 
who is not present in person at the sale. 
However, the trustee has no implied authority 
to bid on behalf of the creditor: hence, 
where the creditor directs the trustee to 
sell for the entire debt due, but sends no 
bid nor authorizes any to be made for him, a 
bid by the trustee in the creditor's 
acceptance of a deed, the mere execution of a 
deed, without acceptance by the creditor, 
passes no title. (Emphasis added. )" 59 
C. J. S. Mortgages. §578(b). 
Additional limitations on any implied authority exist. 
"There can be no implication of authority where the subject is 
covered by express authority, and a distinct and independent 
power cannot be made to spring from the grant of another power. " 
2A C. J. S. , Agency, §154. (Emphasis added). Under Utah statute, 
the trustee is the only person authorized to conduct a non-
judicial foreclosure of a trust deed. The authority granted by 
statute is to sell. The trustee' s authority to buy for the 
beneficiary does not spring from the mere request that the 
trustee perform his statutory duty to sell the property. Buying 
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requires a separate and distinct grant of power. 
It is generally recognized that a trustee owes both the 
trustor and the beneficiary a fiduciary duty to act fairly. Cox 
v. Helenius, 693 P. 2d 683 (Wash. 1985); Blodaett v. Martsch, 590 
P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978). This dual duty also precludes a finding of 
inherent or plenary authority to buy at the sale on behalf of 
either party, especially in the circumstances of this case where 
either the trustor or beneficiary will be harmed by the bid. If 
the duty or right to bid is inherent, does the trustee then have 
to determine the fair market value of the property, at its own 
risk, so as to act fairly? If the duty or right is inherent, 
could not the trustee have bid one dollar for the property on 
behalf of the trustor. The trustee is not ipso facto an agent 
with authority to bid for either party. Any finding of inherent 
or implied authority to determine a bid and to buy at the sale 
would defeat the trustees' duty to act impartially. 
In summary, there was no evidence in this case of any 
actual authority, either express or implied, given by Bodell to 
anyone to either determine the amount to be bid at the first sale 
or to purchase at the sale. Based upon the record before the 
trial court, this court can conclude, as a matter of law, that 
there was no authority in the trustee, either express or implied, 
to purchase at the sale and this court should reverse the trial 
court' s conclusion that actual authority existed in Associated 
Title. 
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B. Associated Title did not have apparent authority to 
purchase the propertyt 
The trial court concluded that Associated Title had 
apparent authority to enter the bid and purchase the property at 
the first sale on behalf of Bodell. (R. 573. ) The facts 
advanced by Snelson in support of such a conclusion were set 
forth in defendants' Memorandum, (R. 484-490. ) Facts advanced 
by Bodell were set forth in its Reply Memorandum. (R. 518-524. ) 
The standard of review is the same for each issue presented in 
this brief, i.e., this court may review any of the trial court' s 
conclusions for correctness. Gillman, supra, p. 10. 
In order to prove apparent authority, all of the following 
elements must be established: 
1. Acts or conduct of the principal (Bodell); 
2. Reliance on those acts by a third person (here 
McOmber or Snelson); and 
3. A resulting change in position by the third 
person. 
2A C. J. S. , Agency §157. 
It is well settled law in Utah that apparent or ostensible 
authority of an agent (here, Associated) can be inferred only 
from the acts and the conduct of the principal (Bodell). Bank of 
Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church, etc. , 534 P. 2d 
887 (Utah 1975). The authority of an agent is not apparent 
merely because it looks so to the person with whom the agent 
deals. It is the principal who must cause third parties to 
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believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority. Kuhn 
v. Kuhn, 642 P. 2d 524 (Colo. App. 1981), reh. den. (1982). City 
Electric v. Dean Evans Chrvsler-Plvmouth. 672 P. 2d 89 (Utah 
1983). 
Snelson never had any contact with Bodell at any time. 
(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. ) There was no evidence 
that Snelson ever had any contact with Associated Title. 
McOmber never spoke to the trustee before the sale. There 
was no evidence that McOmber ever spoke with Bodell about 
Associated Title or their authority at the sale. (McOmber 
deposition, R. 287, p. 23. ) 
In light of these circumstances, there is no basis to 
conclude that acts of Bodell created apparent authority in 
Associated to purchase the property at the sale. 
The second element of apparent authority is reliance on acts 
of the principal by, in this case, Snelson and McOmber. No 
reliance was demonstrated by either Snelson or McOmber. 
The third element of apparent authority is "a resulting 
change in position" by, in this case, Snelson and McOmber. 
Neither Snelson nor McOmber have contended that they changed 
their position, let alone changed their position as a result of 
Bodell' s acts. Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the sale. 
Neither contended that they withheld bids or withheld efforts to 
cure the default or sell the property in reliance on any act of 
Bodell or Associated, or any understanding they had about 
Associated' s authority. 
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Snelson argued that McOmber "obviously relied on the 
authority of Associated Title by performing acts that indicated 
title had been divested from him, relinquishing the rent checks 
to Mr. Bodell, not resisting the transfer of names on the listing 
agreement . . . " These events occurred after the August sale, 
and cannot be the basis of apparent authority at the time of the 
sale. McOmber's "reliance" is, at a minimum, subject to 
differing interpretations in view of McOmber' s subsequent 
relisting of the property and his continued occupancy of the home 
without making any payments. When Mr. McOmber was informed that 
the first sale was invalid, he was pleased that he would be 
allowed to remain in the home and to continue to try to sell it. 
(Bodell deposition, R. 288, p. 61.) If anything, Mr. McOmber 
acquiesced in the fact that Associated Title did not have 
authority to enter the bid at the first trustee' s sale. 
Snelson' s argument on apparent authority is circuitous - it 
assumes and uses as a starting point the ultimate issue, i. e. 
whether Associated had full and complete authority. A 
beneficiary' s request of a trustee to foreclose, standing alone, 
does not cloak a trustee with apparent authority to bid and 
purchase for the beneficiary any more than it cloaks the trustee 
with apparent authority to bid for the trustor. In summary, 
Bodell did nothing to create apparent authority, there was no 
reliance, and no change of position by defendants. 
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II 
BODELL DID NOT RATIFY THE AUGUST TRUSTEE'S 
SALE. 
Snelson argued, and the trial court concluded, that Bodell 
ratified Associated' s purchase of the property at the August sale 
and that the ratification precludes any claim by Bodell that the 
bid was unauthorized. 
The trial court's conclusions are subject to review for 
correctness. Qillman v. Dept. of Finan. Inst. , 782 P. 2d 506 
(Utah 1989). This court should review all facts in the light 
most favorable to Bodell. Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 
941 (Utah A. 1989). 
In order for ratification to occur, the following elements 
must be satisfied: 1) the principal's knowledge of material 
facts, and 2) an intent by the principal to ratify. And if the 
law requires the authority to have been given in writing, the 
ratification must also be in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 
P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982); 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency §185, et sea. 
Ratification is a matter of intention. Its existence is a 
question of fact. Ratification cannot be inferred from acts 
which may be explained without any intent to ratify. 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Agency §187. Applied to this case, where Bodell never understood 
that Associated might bid any amount at the sale or that the 
amount bid at the sale was a factor in determining the 
deficiency, there was not knowledge sufficient to find 
ratification. (R. 502, 503; Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36, 
48, 52, 64, 110.) The clearest evidence of Bodell's lack of 
27 
intent flows from his conduct after he received the trustees 
deed. He immediately advised all involved that the bid was not 
authorized and reconveyed the property to Associated. (R. 503, 
207. ) McOmber obviously acquiesced in this conduct by relisting 
the property for sale himself and continuing to reside in the 
home. At a minimum, there is an issue of fact regarding Bodell' s 
intent to ratify where Bodell testified that he never intended to 
discharge defendants from liability after the sale, and never 
understood that the unauthorized bid might hinder his ability to 
obtain full satisfaction, or even that a bid would be entered at 
the sale. (R. 502, 503. ) 
This case is analogous to Fuller v. Fasia Tipton Co. , Inc. , 
587 F. 2d 103 (CA 2 1978). In Fuller, ratification was considered 
in the context of whether or not ratification of a transaction 
could occur where the principal was unaware of the legal 
consequences of a custom in the horse auction business. The 
court concluded that ratification could not occur unless the 
custom was understood and agreed to. 
U. C. A. §25-5-1, the Utah statute of frauds requires that 
"No . . . power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner related thereto, 
shall be created . . . otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed of conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized bv writing. " (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The purported right of Associated to purchase as an agent on 
behalf of Bodell is a power over real property. Because the 
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authority to purchase must be given in writing, U.C. A. §25-5-1, 
any ratification by Bodell must also be in writing. Williams v. 
Singleton, 723 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986). The only writing of 
Bodell subsequent to the first sale was the quit-claim deed back 
to Associated to ". . . reconvey a trustee's deed . 
erroneously given . . . . " There was no written ratification of 
Associated' s bid - only a written renunciation. 
The purpose of the principal of ratification, as applied to 
an agency relationship, is to prevent unjust enrichment to the 
principal and to assure that no loss accrues to innocent third 
parties. Old Security Life Insur. Co. v. Continental Illinois 
National Bank & Trust, 740 F. 2d 1384 (CA 7 1984). There was no 
unjust enrichment to Bodell. 
At a minimum, material conflicting inferences can be drawn 
from what Bodell knew and its intent to ratify. It is not 
possible to look at what occurred, especially Bodell's conduct in 
October of 1984, and conclude as a matter of law that it ratified 
Associated' s purchase of the property. 
Ill 
THE NOVEMBER SALE IS NOT BARRED BY ANY 
"UNILATERAL MISTAKE." 
The trial court also concluded (R. 573) that "a beneficiary 
[Bodell] cannot unilaterally abrogate a trustee's sale for his 
own advantage on the grounds of his own unilateral mistake. " 
In this action, it cannot be said that Bodell made any 
mistake regarding the bid at the sale. Bodell did not know that 
any amount had to be bid at the sale. Bodell did not know that 
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Associated had requested information from Landmark, even about a 
payoff. Bodell did not know that Associated had been given any 
reason to believe it had any authority to bid. (Bodell 
deposition, 2/8/89, p. 53; R. 501, 502. ) The mistake that gave 
rise to the unauthorized bid was that of Associated, and perhaps 
Landmark, in not obtaining bidding instructions. The first 
"sale" did not occur because of any mistake of Bodell, let alone 
a unilateral mistake by Bodell. 
IV 
THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST BODELL. 
There were, in effect, competing motions before the court 
asking for summary judgment. (R. 190, 221. ) It remains Bodell's 
primary position that it was entitled to summary judgment, 
declaring the first sale void purely as a matter of law based 
upon Associated' s lack of authority to purchase for Bodell at the 
sale. For all the reasons discussed, Bodell believes there was 
no purchaser at the August sale. This court is entitled to 
substitute its own conclusions for those of the trial court, and 
to reverse the case as a matter of law. 
At a minimum, there are issues of fact which preclude 
summary judgment against Bodell. In considering the facts 
presented, this court must review them such that all reasonable 
inferences are drawn in favor of Bodell. Seftel v. Capital Citv 
Bank, 767 P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 1989. ) The issues of fact which 
preclude summary judgment against Bodell include the following: 
1. With respect to the January 9, 1984 letter: 
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(a) Bodell understood its purpose was only to 
"get the ball rolling" and not to confer any authority 
in Associated to determine a bid and buy at the sale, 
(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26, 28, 29. ); 
(b) Terry understood the letter only to get the 
ball rolling, and not as conferring any authority. 
(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 34-36, 126; R. 214); 
(c) Associated testified that in this case it 
would not have treated the letter as authority to bid. 
(Heiner deposition, p. 22. ) 
At a minimum, this testimony creates an issue as to whether 
express authority to bid or purchase was ever given to 
Associated. The only other basis for the actual authority 
of Associated to purchase at the sale is through some sort 
of authority implied from the sale. In construing this 
authority, standards of practice in the industry are 
significant. The only evidence on this issue was the 
testimony of Alfred Newman (R. 505) that industry standards 
on bidding by trustees require explicit authority from the 
beneficiary. The existence of these standards create, at a 
minimum, an issue of fact as to whether implied authority 
existed in Associated Title to bid. Another issue of fact 
is created by the telephone message from Terry to Heiner 
which clearly states that it is a "payoff," not a bid. 
Construing these facts most favorably to plaintiff, summary 
judgment against Bodell on the issue of actual authority 
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(either express or implied) was inappropriate. Sandbera v. 
Kline, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
2. There was no evidence that any conduct by Bodell 
created apparent authority. 
3. There was no evidence that Bodell "knowingly or 
intentionally" ratified the unauthorized bid. Bodell 
testified that it did not understand the sale process or the 
significance of the bid. (Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36, 
38, supra. ) This lack of understanding, when construed in 
the light most favorable to Bodell, creates a fact issue as 
to whether the material facts surrounding the transaction 
were brought home to Bodell sufficiently so that it can be 
said that a knowing, intentional ratification occurred. 
4. With respect to the issue of mistake, the 
Memorandum of Snelson alone, R. 487, para. 9, acknowledges 
disputes of fact as to how the mistake arose with respect to 
the bid. 
5. There is a sister case to this one presently 
pending in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Civil No. C88-5531. The action is one by Bodell against 
Associated Title alleging, inter alia, negligence on the 
part of Associated Title. On December 8, 1989, the parties 
in that action (including Snelson and McOmber) argued 
motions for summary judgment which included the issue of 
whether Bodell ratified the first sale. Judge Daniels 
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. (A certified copy 
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of Associated7 s Memorandum and the court' s ruling are 
appended hereto.) Judge Daniels' conclusion reflects, that 
at least with respect to the issue of ratification, that 
facts exist on which reasonable men could reach different 
conclusions. 
When Bodell' s statement of facts are considered in the light 
most favorable to Bodell, at a minimum, there are significant 
material issues of fact which preclude summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment should be reversed, and the case 
remanded for the determination of the deficiency, if any, to be 
awarded Bodell. In the alternative, the summary judgment against 
Bodell should be set aside and the matter remanded to be set for 
trial in the District Court. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 1990. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 
Kei th W. M e a d e (Bar N o . 2218) 
C O H N E , R A P P A P O R T <5c S E G A L 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2665 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID McOMBER, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE HEINER 
Civil No. 68297 
Judge Ballif 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BLAKE HEINER, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am an officer of Associated title Company and have personal knowledge 
of the matters set forth herein. 
2. I was the officer of Associated Title who conducted the sales of the 
property described on Exhibit "A" attached, on August 31, 1984 and November 19, 1984. 
3. Prior to the August 31 sale, I had no communication with Michael Bodell or 
anyone from Bodell Construction. 
4. Prior to the August 31 sale, I received a telephone message from Roger 
Terry of Landmark Mortgage, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit nB". I did not speak 
with Roger Terry regarding the message until after the August 31 sale. 
5 . No one that I was aware of attended the sale of the property on August 31, 
1984 other than myself. 
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0 . Th« bid r*tmrrm<l to in i>«r.uwi * , . < . , . . . 
No 27110 was made by myself based upon the telephone message referred to in paragraph 
4 above, that I received from Roger Terry. 
7. I was informed after the August 31 sale by Bodell Construction and Roger 
Terry that the amount referred to in paragraph G of the Trusteed Deed was not intended 
to be a bid amount. 
8. I was never given, by Roger Terry, ^Landmark Mortgage, or anyone from 
Bodell Construction Company, any authority to determine the amount that was to be bid 
at the August 31 trustee's sale on behalf of Bodell Construction Company. 
9. The trusteed sale on November 19, 1984 was conducted at the request of 
Bodell Construction because they told me that my bid at the August 31, 1984 sale was 
not authorized. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
^^^AXA-
Blake T. Heiner 
Vice President 
Associated Title Company 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 4 th day of February, 1986, by 
Blake T. Heiner, the signer of the foregoing instrument. 
/ 
isiding in S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
My Commission Expires; December 17/ 1988 
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Keith W. M e a d e <B«r N o . 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
WILLIAM F. HUISH. CLERK 
.DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH£ FOU ILH J b i / i u ^ L J L J T ^ I W V 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID McOMBER, et al., 
Defendants. 
'AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER TERRY 
V^i > i i * • O * 
Judge Ballif 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ROGER TERRY, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am an officer of Landmark Mortgage and have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I never discussed with Mike Bodell or anyone from Bodell Construction the 
amount to be bid at the Trusteed sale conducted on August 31, 1984. 
3. At no time did I have authority from Mike Bodell or Bodell Construction to 
determine the amount which would be bid at the Trustee's sale of the property which 
occurred on August 31, 1984. 
4. Prior to the sale, Blake Heiner of Associated Title contacted me and asked for 
the payoff figure on the loan. I informed him of the payoff amount. I was not requested 
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to provide any blddl.. s ...„,.rua,.,<„,, w l l h r « w « r u %t> t„„ „ 
DATED t h i s j # day of January, 1987. 
, ^ S ^ _ CA^ 
Roger Terry / ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 30 day of TfwuAty , 1986, 
by fe/6/- l&Tr-r , the signer of the foregoing instrument 
M
 v 
Notary Public p 
My Commission Expires: 
otary rubiic u »*/ . I ^<r 
Residing in ^JK $QL £ L f f \ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Roger Terry was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this IJ~ day of Jamtaty, 
1987, to the following: 
B. Ray Zoll 
Attorney at Law 
5251 South Green Street, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Rand Hirschi 
Attorney at Law 
City Centre 
400 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Bodell-2) 
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EXHIBIT 
C P H O I M E C S ^ V d T ^ 
FOR. 
-bxAftfi 
M 
O F . 
ga^Z. .OATH Ekm^«l 
PHONE 
AKEACOOe 
MESSAGE 
• < % / ^ » / 
r^?^, 
U3EAC006 lyuMeCR • 
ISIST^nUi 
AjArfoEm IONED 
RETURNED 
YOUR CALL 
PLEASE CALL 
WLLCALL AGAIN 
CAME 
TO SEE YOU 
WANTS 
TO SEE YOU 
s TOPS W FORM 4 0 0 3 -> 
;XHJBlT"c» 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Associated Title Company 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
DISTRICT COURT 
.< y.3T3tCt 
zC^T7--:s 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LANDMARK MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
DAVID I. McOMBER and RACHEL B. 
McOMBER as trustees of the 
David I. McOmber Family Trust, 
and DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B. 
McOMBER, and STEVEN M. SNELSON, 
individually, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-5531 
(Hon. Scott Daniels) 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant Associated Title Company respectfully submits this 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
To place in context the uncontested facts that follow, 
Associated Title Company offers the following summary of the facts 
and arguments that are germane to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
before the Court. 
Michael Bodell is a principal of Bodell Construction Company, 
Inc. Either or both are sometimes referred to hereinafter as 
"Bodell." Landmark Mortgage Company is a company that is owned 
and controlled by Roger Terry and which engages in the mortgage 
brokering and arranging business. Associated Title Company, as 
its name suggests, is a title company that sometimes conducts 
trustee's sales under trust deeds. Blake Heiner is an employee of 
Associated Title Company. 
Roger Terry and his company, Landmark Mortgage Company, 
brokered and/or arranged a $200,000 mortgage loan from Bodell 
Construction Company, Inc. to third-party defendants Snelson and 
McOmbers. Snelson and McOmbers did not pay as agreed, and Bodell 
requested that Landmark and Terry cause to be initiated a fore-
closure of the Trust Deed securing the loan. Landmark and Terry 
requested that Associated Title Company act as trustee in con-
nection with that foreclosure. At the trustee's sale, Associated 
Title Company bid on behalf of Bodell Construction Company 
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approximately $230,000, which was the full amount then owed to 
Bodell. Bodell thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to sell the 
property for about the same amount. Being unable to do so, Bodell 
spoke to his lawyer, who suggested that Bodell claim that the 
trustee was unauthorized to bid the full loan amount, rescind the 
original sale, conduct a new sale at a lower price, and sue the 
borrowers for a deficiency. This was accomplished. After the new 
sale at the lesser price, Bodell initiated a deficiency action 
against McOmbers and Snelson in the District Court of Utah County. 
After the District Court of Utah County ruled that the first sale 
was effective and, accordingly, McOmbers and Snelson had no 
liability to Bodell, Bodell initiated this action against 
Associated Title Company. 
In this action, Bodell seeks to recover from Associated the 
deficiency that he claims he would otherwise have recovered, 
claiming that Associated Title Company, as trustee under the Trust 
Deed, improperly and without his authority bid the full amount 
owed to Bodell at the trustee's sale, depriving him of a defi-
ciency judgment against McOmbers and Snelson and resulting in 
damages of some $80,000. 
The thrust of the Motion for Summary Judgment is that, 
irrespective of whether Bodell did or did not authorize the bid 
that was made at the first trustee's sale, Bodell by his conduct 
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ratified that sale, waived any claim that the bid was unauthorized, 
and is estopped to assert that the bid was unauthorized. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The following facts, for purposes of this Motion only, are 
undisputed: 
1. Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage arranged 8 to 12 
mortgage loans for Bodell, All were handled in basically the same 
manner -- Terry brought Bodell a loan application package describ-
ing the prospective loan, assisted in the closing of the loan, 
serviced the loan by collecting payments, handled communications 
on behalf of Bodell with the owner/debtor, and, when foreclosure 
was necessary, Terry handled it for Bodell. [Bodell Deposition at 
15-17.] 
2. In late 1983, Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage arranged 
the subject loan for Bodell. Bodell loaned $200,000 to the 
McOmbers and Snelson. Among other things, Terry gave Bodell an 
appraisal showing that the McOmber house was worth $300,000. 
Bodell himself did not look at the property before making the 
loan. [Bodell Deposition at 14-15, 18.] The loan was to bear 18 
percent per annum as interest and was secured by the McOmber 
residence. [Bodell Deposition at 14-15; Deposition Exhibit 2.] 
3. McOmbers and Snelson did not make a payment under the 
loan and so Bodell caused foreclosure proceedings to be initiated. 
[Bodell Deposition at 24-25.] 
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4. Bodell directed Terry to assist him in proceeding with 
foreclosure and gave Terry a letter to Landmark Mortgage Company 
dated January 9, 1984, which stated as follows: 
Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as authori-
zation to immediately begin foreclosure 
against the property associated with this 
loan. 
We hereby grant you and the title company 
of your choice full and complete authority 
regarding this foreclosure action. 
Please inform me if you require further 
information. 
Very truly yours, 
s/ Michael J. Bodell 
Bodell knew that Terry was going to give this letter to a title 
company and assumed that the title company would rely on it. 
[Bodell Deposition at 25-26; Deposition Exhibit 5.] Terry gave 
this letter to Associated Title Company. [Terry Deposition at 
40.] 
5. During April, 1984, Bodell signed a Substitution of 
Trustee, appointing Associated Title Company as successor trustee 
under the McOmber Trust Deed. [Bodell Deposition at 34-35.] 
6. In early May, 1984, Bodell requested that Terry furnish 
him with the appraisal on the McOmber property that was a part of 
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the loan application package because Bodell wanted some idea of 
the value of the property being foreclosed. [Bodell Deposition at 
39-40.] That appraisal indicated that the value of the McOmber 
property was $300,000. [Bodell Deposition at 18; Deposition 
Exhibit 1.] Bodell received no other appraisal prior to the 
trustee's sale. [Bodell Deposition at 40.] 
7. Associated Title Company issued a Notice of Trustee's 
Sale under the McOmber Trust Deed on July 30, 1984. That Notice 
of Trustee's Sale scheduled the sale for August 31, 1984. [Depo-
sition Exhibit 11.] Associated Title Company mailed the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale both to Landmark Mortgage Company and to Bodell on 
July 31, 1984, and both Landmark Mortgage Company and Bodell 
received the Notice of Trustee's Sale on August 1, 1984. [Affi-
davit of Blake T. Heiner, H 4 and 5.] 
8. Bodell knew, prior to August 31, 1984, that there was 
going to be a trustee's sale under the McOmber Trust Deed at that 
time. [Bodell Deposition at 45.] Although Bodell expected that 
Bodell would buy the property at the sale, (i) Bodell never spoke 
with anyone at Associated Title Company prior to the sale and (ii) 
Bodell did not convey any bidding instructions to Landmark or 
Terry prior to the sale. Bodell knew that Associated Title 
Company could not have received any bidding instructions prior to 
the sale. [Bodell Deposition at 47-48, 52, and 57.] 
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9. The parties' testimony differs as to the bidding in-
structions that were given to Associated Title Company. Associated 
acknowledges that there are disputed facts in this area, but those 
facts are irrelevant to this Motion. The parties1 versions are 
included here only because those versions will be helpful to the 
Court's understanding of the overall facts. 
(a) Associated asserts that it telephoned Terry or his 
office and requested instructions as to what should be bid at 
the trustee's sale and thereafter received a telephone 
message stating that the payoff at the sale was to be 
$243,127.15. [Heiner Deposition at 9-10.] 
(b) Terry asserts that Associated requested a "payoff," 
and Terry called Associated Title Company with a "payoff 
amount," which was the full amount owed under the loan, 
including a part of Terry's commission on the loan that was 
then unpaid. [Terry Deposition at 56; Affidavit of Roger 
Terry (Deposition Exhibit 24).] 
(c) Bodell asserts that Associated should have bid the 
fair market value of the property, but concedes that he gave 
no one any bidding instructions and that no one ever told 
Associated Title Company what the fair market value was. 
[Bodell Deposition at 62-65.] 
10. The trustee's sale was conducted on August 31, 1984, and 
Associated credit bid $243,681.90 on behalf of Bodell and pur-
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chased the property for Bodell. [Deposition Exhibit 14 to Bodell 
Deposition.] 
11. Within a week to ten days after the sale on August 31, 
1984, Bodell was told by Terry that the sale had occurred and that 
approximately $240,000 had been bid for the property. [Bodell 
Deposition at 67-68.] During that same conversation, Bodell 
claims that he objected to the amount bid by Associated Title 
Company. [Bodell Deposition at 79-80.] 
12. After learning of the sale and bid amount, Bodell 
contacted Cal Monson, a realtor, to list and sell the property. 
Bodell, as owner, signed a Listing Agreement with Monson, autho-
rizing Monson to sell the property for $239,000. [Bodell Deposi-
tion at 70-72; Deposition Exhibit 16.] When Bodell signed the 
Listing Agreement as owner, he knew that Bodell owned the property 
because it had purchased it at a trustee's sale, that the bid 
price had been wrong at that trustee's sale, and that Bodell did 
not like the bid. [Bodell Deposition at 71, 80.] 
13. During late September, 1984, Bodell received from Roger 
Terry a rent check in the amount of $200.00 from Jeff and Kathy 
Kober, who were renting the bottom portion of the McOmber home. 
Bodell cashed the check. [Bodell Deposition at 73-74; Deposition 
Exhibit 17.] At the time he cashed the check, Bodell understood 
that the money was rent from people who lived in the basement of 
the property that he had purchased at a foreclosure sale, that the 
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bid price was wrong at the foreclosure sale, and that he objected 
to that bid price. [Bodell Deposition at 74, 80.] 
14. If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 1984 
(after Bodell knew of the trustee's sale and the amount bid at 
that sale), and offered to purchase the property for $239,000 in 
cash, he would have sold it to them. [Bodell Deposition at 
72-73.] 
15. During early October, 1984, Bodell became concerned 
about whether the property was worth what had been bid for it, and 
so Bodell called his attorney, Richard Rappaport, "because I 
wanted to know what we do now that it's becoming obvious to me 
that the property isn't going to solve my debt problem. Isn't 
going to be, isn't going to net us anywhere near what is owed us. 
So the next step was, well, how do we get the difference." 
[Bodell Deposition at 77-78.] 
16. On October 3, 1984, Bodell and Terry met with Bodell's 
counsel, Richard Rappaport. At that meeting, according to Terry's 
notes, with which Bodell agrees, "Mr. Rappaport said to get bid 
down must claim trustee did not have authority to bid amount he 
did." [Bodell Deposition at 82-83; Deposition Exhibit 13.] 
17. Thereafter, Rappaport, Bodell, and Terry attempted to 
undo the effects of the first trustee's s.ale: 
(a) Mr. Rappaport instructed Mr. Terry to call the 
McOmbers and tell them that an error was made and that they 
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could stay in the house for another 30 days* [Bodell Deposi-
tion at 84; Deposition Exhibit 13.] 
(b) Bodell also instructed Terry to tell McOmbers to 
keep the home on the market but that the ownership listing 
would have to be changed (to reflect McOmbers as owner, 
rather than Bodell, as owner). [Bodell Deposition at 85; 
Deposition Exhibit 13.] 
(c) McOmbers did in fact execute a Listing Agreement as 
owners with Cal Monson dated October 4, 1984. [Deposition 
Exhibit 18.] 
(d) Mr. Rappaport directed Associated Title Company to 
record a Quitclaim Deed conveying the property from Bodell 
Construction Company back to Associated Title Company, as 
trustee, so that another trustee's sale could be conducted. 
[Bodell Deposition at 94; Deposition Exhibit 19.] 
(e) Bodell secured a new appraisal, dated November 6, 
1984, to determine the fair market value of the property. 
[Bodell Deposition at 95.] 
(f) At the request of Mr. Rappaport, Associated Title 
Company thereafter conducted a second trustee's sale of the 
property on November 19, 1984 and, at the direction of 
Bodell, bid $170,000. [Affidavit of Blake T. Heiner, 16.] 
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ARGUMENT 
For two independently sufficient reasons, Associated Title 
Company is entitled to the dismissal with prejudice of the Com-
plaint as against Associated Title Company. Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
A. Bodell has waived and is estopped to assert any claim 
against Associated Title Company. Under Utah law, a waiver occurs 
when one intentionally relinquishes a known right. Hunter v. 
Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Such a waiver may be either 
express or implied from the conduct of the parties.
 <Id. Here, 
the undisputed facts establish that Bodell waived any claim that 
Associated Title Company lacked authority to bid the amount that 
was bid at the first trustee's sale and/or Bodell waived the right 
to direct Associated Title Company to bid a sum other than the one 
that was bid at the first sale. 
As Bodell's own testimony establishes, Bodell had knowledge 
of the following matters prior to the August 31, 1984 sale: 
First, Bodell knew that the sale would occur on August 31, 1984. 
Second, Bodell knew that he had delivered a letter to Landmark, 
which would be delivered to a title company, which "grant[ed] you 
and the title company of your choice full and complete authority 
regarding this foreclosure action.!! Third, Bodell expected that 
Bodell would be the purchaser at the trustee's sale and that, 
accordingly, someone would have to bid on behalf of Bodell. 
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Fourth, Bodell knew that he had not given any instructions, 
directly, to Associated Title Company concerning bidding at the 
sale and that the only communication concerning bidding at the 
sale was his communication to Roger Terry to the effect that he, 
Bodell, might attend the sale. Thus, Bodell knew that the sale 
would go forward without any instructions or directions from 
Bodell as to bidding. A clearer case of an intentional relin-
quishment of a known right cannot be imagined. Bodell knowingly 
relinquished his right to direct the bidding at the sale by 
allowing the sale to occur without attending the sale or giving 
any bidding instructions, all the time knowing that he had the 
right to do so and that no arrangements concerning bidding had 
been made by Bodell. 
Bodell is also estopped to assert any claim against Associated 
Title Company arising from its bidding on Bodell?s behalf at the 
first sale. This estoppel has two distinct sources. First, 
Bodell is estopped because he knew that he had not given anyone 
any bidding instructions and allowed the sale to proceed without 
giving such instructions. The Utah Supreme Court has established 
that the doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his 
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he ought 
to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist and such 
other relies thereon to his detriment. E.g., Leaver v. Grose, 610 
P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980). Here, Bodell delivered a letter of author-
-12-
ity to Landmark Mortgage Company, which he knew would be delivered 
to a title company. That letter of authority granted to the title 
company "full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure 
action.tf Bodell testified that he knew the title company would 
rely upon the authorization letter. Bodell never spoke with 
Associated Title Company prior to the trustee's sale. Bodell knew 
that no bidding instructions had been given prior to the trustee's 
sale and that no one would be appearing on behalf of Bodell at the 
trustee's sale. Thus, Bodell knew that the trustee's sale would 
occur and that Associated Title Company would not have received, 
prior thereto, any instructions other than the blanket authority 
granted in Bodell!s authorization letter granting the title 
company "full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure 
action." With knowledge of those facts, Bodell's failure to take 
any action to either appear at the sale and bid or advise 
Associated Title Company of what bid was expected precludes Bodell 
from now complaining about the bid that was made at the sale. 
Associated, in ignorance of Bodellfs secret bidding desires, 
conducted the sale, bid the amount of the debt, and has now 
obviously suffered a detriment. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has embraced acquiescence as 
providing the basis for an estoppel. In Zeese v. Estate of 
Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975), the Court held that where a party-
does not challenge an allegedly unauthorized act, but instead by 
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his act and conduct indicates acquiescence in the act, the party 
is estopped to assert that the act was unauthorized. To the same 
effect, see Larsen v. Knight, 232 P.2d 365 (Utah 1951). Here, 
according to Bodell, he learned within a week to ten days after 
the first trustee's sale that the sale had occurred and that 
Associated Title had bid on behalf of Bodell the amount of the 
debt against the property. With the knowledge that Bodell had 
purchased the property at the trustee's sale for the amount of the 
loan, Bodell proceeded to list the property for sale and to 
collect the rents from the property. Bodell obviously acquiesced 
in the sale, because he immediately began to capitalize upon its 
benefits -- ownership. Because Bodell acquiesced in the sale, he 
is estopped to assert that the bid resulting in that sale to him 
was inappropriate. 
B. Bodell ratified the first trustee's sale and the bid 
that resulted in Bodell's purchase. All of Bodell's claims 
against Associated are premised upon the assertion that Associated 
exceeded its authority by bidding as it did at the first trustee's 
sale. It will be established below that Bodell ratified 
Associated's purchase of the property on behalf of Bodell and that 
such ratification releases Associated of all liability arising 
from any claim that its bid was unauthorized. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 
(Utah 1984) stated as follows: 
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When an agent exceeds his express authority, • . . 
ratification by the principal releases the 
agent from liability and damages. Ici. at 462. 
To the same effect, see Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 
571, 573 (Utah 1951), and Restatement of Agency 2d, §338. Thus, 
if it can be established that Bodell ratified Associated1s pur-
chase of the property at the first sale, it follows that Bodell 
can have no claim against Associated arising from its bidding and 
purchasing the property at the first sale on behalf of Bodell. 
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571 (Utah 
1951), the Court held as follows: 
Ratification like original authority need not 
be expressed. Any conduct which indicates 
assent by the purported principal to become a 
party to the transaction or which is justifi-
able only if there is ratification is suffi-
cient. Even silence with full knowledge of 
the facts may manifest affirmance and thus 
operate as a ratification. Id., at 573-574. 
In Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Ratification is expressed or implied. 
Implied, where it arises under circumstances 
of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm 
is not promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually, 
is a requisite to any form of ratification. 
In the Lowe case, the Court held that a party with knowledge of a 
transaction and an agent's acts ratified the agentfs acts by 
failing to disaffirm them within a reasonable time. 
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Similarly, in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 479 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1971), the Court addressed a claim against the makers of a 
note who claimed they were not liable under the note because their 
alleged agent improperly and without authority wrote in payment 
terms on the note after they had executed it. The Supreme Court 
held that the makers of the note had ratified their agent's act by 
executing extensions of the note after learning that their alleged 
agent had inserted the payment terms about which they objected. 
The foregoing cases stand for the proposition that when a 
party, with knowledge of an alleged unauthorized act of his agent, 
by his conduct indicates that he affirms the agent's act, a 
ratification occurs. "Any conduct which indicates assent by the 
purported principal to become a party to the transaction or which 
is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient.11 
Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, supra at 574. 
The application of the doctrine is especially clear when the 
party challenging the agent's authority accepts the benefits of 
the agent's exercise of such authority. In Moses v. Archie 
McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that when an agent acts without authority, the principal 
cannot confirm such part of his action as is beneficial and reject 
such part as is detrimental -- ratification of part of the trans-
action ratifies the whole of the transaction. "If a principal 
ratifies part of a transaction, he is deemed to ratify the whole 
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of it.!f Navrides v. Zurich Ins. Co., 488 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1971). 
Similarly, in Floor v. Mitchell, 41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935), the 
Court stated as follows: 
When a principal claims the benefits of a 
contract made by his agent, he cannot repudiate 
the acts of his agent on the grounds such acts 
were unauthorized. Accepting a contract and 
claiming the fruits thereof, the principal 
takes with whatever taint attaches to its 
origin. Id., at 287. 
To the same effect, see Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 100 P.2d 619 
(Utah 1940). 
Based upon the testimony of Michael Bodell, alone, the 
doctrine of ratification clearly applies here and absolves 
Associated of liability. Bodell testified that, within a week to 
ten days after the August 31, 1984 sale, he knew that the sale had 
occurred and the amount that Associated had bid on his behalf at 
the sale. He also knew that he had become the owner of the 
property by virtue of Associated1s bidding and purchasing the 
property for Bodell at the sale. With that knowledge, Bodell 
proceeded to enjoy the benefits of property ownership. He, as 
owner, listed the property for sale. He, as owner, accepted and 
cashed at least one rent check from the property. He testified 
that, if anyone had offered to purchase the property for the 
listed sale price, he would have sold the property to them. 
Bodell cannot have it both ways. He cannot assert that he is the 
owner of the property and entitled to sell same and receive rent 
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from same but, if things don't work out as he hopes, take the 
position that the bid resulting in his purchase of the property 
was unauthorized. A clearer case of ratification cannot be 
imagined. Further, since the only facts upon which this defense 
is based come from Michael Bodellfs deposition, there can be no 
issue of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the doctrines of ratification, waiver, and estop-
pel, Bodell is precluded from recovering against Associated Title 
Company. The facts dictating the application of those doctrines 
are not in dispute, nor can they be, since the source of those 
facts is the deposition of Michael Bodell. Summary Judgment 
should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 jteft of QcrrfoBL. 1989. 
Maak, Of Counsel 
[LL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
ftorneys for Defendant 
Associated Title Company 
<.JK/, -jym^ 
1 ' 
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Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
INC. , a Utah corporation, ) ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs ) 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) Civil No. C88-5531 
Defendant. ) 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff , 
vs ) Judge Scott Daniels 
LANDMARK MORTGAGE COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
DAVIS I. McOMBER and RACHEL B. ) 
McOMBER as trustees of the ) 
David I. McOmber Family Trust, ) 
and DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B. ) 
McOMBER, and STEVEN M. SNELSON, ) 
individually, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendants. ) 
QF.C 2 1 £?9 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came on before the court on December 8, 198 9, 
pursuant to the motion of Associated Title for partial summary 
judgment. 
Also before the court was the motion of Bodell Construction 
to continue the trial date based upon matters pending in the Utah 
County action involving some of the same parties. There was no 
opposition to the motion to continue by any party, either in 
writing or at oral argument. 
The court, having considered the pleadings filed and the 
argument of counsel, hereby 
ORDERS that the Motion of Associated Title for Summary 
Judgment be and hereby is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the trial presently set in this 
matter to commence on January 16, 1990, be continued without 
date. Any party may request in the future that the matter be 
rescheduled for trial. 
* DATED this 9^ daY o f December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
S u*jJr\\,... 'Jjft 
Judge Scott Daniels 
District Judge 
